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TO RECOGNIZE OR NOT? GOOD FAITH 
UNDER NIGERIAN LAW OF CONTRACT 
OLABISI D. AKINKUGBE* 
ABSTRACT.  Unlike jurisdictions such as Canada and the 
United Kingdom, Nigerian courts have not engaged with the 
doctrine of good faith. On the contrary, there is a dearth of 
academic scholarship that examines this aspect of the Nigerian 
law of contract. This paper examines how the Nigerian courts 
have operationalized the common law of good faith in the 
performance of contracts. Rather than suggest that good faith 
as “an organizing principle” has an internally consistent 
meaning by which we can transplant the doctrine from one 
jurisdiction to another, or even apply the so-called duty of 
honest performance as enunciated by the Supreme Court of 
Canada.  The author contends that there is an inherent value 
for the Nigerian courts to carry on with the 
piecemeal/traditional approach in the application of the 
doctrine of good faith. 
 
*Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S., 
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(University of Lagos, Nigeria), email: olabisi.akinkugbe@dal.ca. Thank you very 
much to Bayo Majekolagbe for his excellent research assistance. I acknowledge the 
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this paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented as “Normative 
Implications of Bhasin v Hrynew in Nigerian Contract Law” at the Université de 
Montréal, Faculty of Law, Common Law Group, 2018 Symposium on “Good Faith in 
Contract”, May 10-11, 2018, Montreal, Canada.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In contemporary contract law scholarship in some 
Common law and Civil law jurisdictions, the concept of good 
faith has been the subject of numerous academic inquiries.1 The 
2014 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Bhasin v. 
Hrynew has reignited contentious debates on the question 
whether the common law should recognize a duty of good 
faith.2 Unlike common law jurisdictions such as Canada (with 
the exception of Quebec), the United Kingdom, Australia and 
the United States of America, the analysis of the concept of good 
faith in the law of contract has not received much judicial or 
academic inquiry in Nigeria.3 Indeed, there are only a handful 
 
 1 For examples of commentaries on the operation of the good faith duty in 
the United States of America, Canada and South Africa, see: Allan Farnsworth, ‘Good 
Faith in Contract Performance’ in Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedman (eds), Good Faith 
and Fault in Contract Law (OUP 1995) 153 – 170; John McCamus, ‘The Implied Duty to 
Perform in Good Faith’ in The Law of Contracts, (Toronto, 2nd edn, Irwin Law 2012) 
835 – 868; and Andre Louw, ‘Yet Another Call for a Greater Role for Good Faith in 
the South African Law of Contract: Can we Banish the Law of the Jungle, While 
Avoiding the Elephant in the Room’ [2013] 16:5 Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal 43, 614. 
 2 Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 SCR 494 (Hereafter Bhasin); See: 
Jeannie Marie Paterson, ‘Good Faith Duties in Contract Performance’ [2014] 14:2 
OUCLJ 283, 309; Geoff Hall, ‘Bhasin v. Hrynew: Towards an Organizing Principle of 
Good Faith in Contract Law’ [2015] 30:2 BFLR 335, 344; Daniele Bertolini, 
‘Decomposing Bhasin v. Hrynew: Towards an Institutional Understanding of the 
General Organizing Principle of Good Faith in Contractual Performance’ [2017] 67:3 
RDUT 348, 410; Claire Mumme, ‘Bhasin v. Hrynew: A New Era for Good Faith in 
Canadian Employment Law, or Just Tinkering at the Margins’ [2016] International 
Journal of Comparative Labour Law 117, 129. 
 3 For a historical account of the Nigerian legal system, see, Akintunde 
Olusegun Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System (London, Sweet & Maxwell 1979). The 
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of cases where the Nigerian courts have examined the common 
law doctrine of good faith. In an emerging economy like 
Nigeria, inequality and imbalance in commercial bargains, and 
the risk that a party will privilege a subjective bad behaviour in 
the performance of its obligations accentuates the need for 
academic debates on the role, if any, of the doctrine of good 
faith addressing them. Yet, there is a dearth of scholarship on 
the subject in Nigeria. 
Against the background of how the concept has 
developed most recently in other Commonwealth jurisdictions 
such as the United Kingdom and Canada, my aim in this article 
is to analyze the trajectory of the doctrine of good faith under 
Nigerian contract law. In analyzing the Nigerian cases, I ask: 
what common sense, if any, emerges from the application of the 
doctrine of good faith by the Nigerian courts? In this regard, I 
also ask whether the Nigerian courts should embrace the 
contemporary analyses of good faith as developed in Bhasin? 
Rather than suggest that good faith has an internally consistent 
meaning by which we can transplant the doctrine from one 
jurisdiction to another, or even apply the so-called duty of 
honest performance, I contend that there is an inherent value 
for the Nigerian courts to carry on with the 
piecemeal/traditional approach in the application of the 
doctrine of good faith.  
Like all human relationships, modern judicial 
interpretation of contracts acknowledge that contracts are 
negotiated and concluded against a background of unstated but 
shared understandings that inform their meaning.4  In other 
 
most popular book on the law of contract did not also discuss this concept, see, 
Itsejuwa Esanjumi Sagay, Nigerian Law of Contract, (Sweet & Maxwell 1985). 
 4 See: Yam Seng Pte Ltd v ITC Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) (Hereafter Yam Seng) 
(Leggatt J) [133]-[135], [139]. It is worth quoting in full: 
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words, while there are shared values and norms of behaviour, 
such as industry custom, that regulate the interpretation of 
contracts, socio-economic and cultural background that are 
relevant to the construction of individual agreements vary.5 
They are not universal.6 In other words, there is no need not to 
adopt a general duty of good faith as an organizing principle or 
even a new duty of honest performance as the Canadian 
Supreme Court did in Bhasin. The argument for the non-
recognition of general duty of good faith in Nigeria are two-
fold: first, that the flexibility the judges have in the application 
of the doctrine under the traditional approach allows them to 
continue to address the diverse commercial disputes that may 
be brought before them;  second, as the post-Bhasin cases so far 
reveal, there are significant challenges associated with applying 
 
The modern case law on the construction of contracts has emphasised that contracts, 
like all human communications, are made against a background of unstated shared 
understandings which inform their meaning. The breadth of the relevant back- 
ground and the fact that it has no conceptual limits have also been stressed . . . 
Importantly for present purposes, the relevant background against which contracts 
are made includes not only matters of fact known to the parties but also shared values 
and norms of behaviour. Some of these are norms that command general social 
acceptance; others may be specific to a particular trade or commercial activity; others 
may be more specific still, arising from features of the particular contractual 
relationship. Many such norms are naturally taken for granted by the parties when 
making any contract without being spelt out in the document recording their 
agreement. A paradigm example of a general norm which underlies almost all 
contractual relationships is an expectation of honesty. That expectation is essential to 
commerce, which depends critically upon trust . . . The central idea [behind fidelity 
to the parties’ bargain] is that contracts can never be complete in the sense of 
expressly providing for every event that may happen. To apply a contract to 
circumstances not specifically provided for, the language must accordingly be given 
a reasonable construction which promotes the values and purposes expressed or 
implicit in the contract.  
 5 See: Menachem Mautner, ‘Contract, Culture, Compulsion, or: What is So 
Problematic in the Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law’, [2002] 3:2 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 545-575. 
 6 See: Yam Seng (n 4) (Leggatt J). 
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the decision. To be sure, I do not suggest that the Nigerian 
courts have systematically examined good faith in the law of 
contract, or, that there is necessarily a coherence that emerges 
from an examination of the cases. Rather, what I hope to 
generate at the end of the article is an understanding of the 
extant application of good faith in the law of contract in Nigeria. 
While I acknowledge the autonomy of the will theory of 
contracts embedded in the classical law of contract, I 
conceptualize the underlying role of the law of contract by 
emphasizing its important social function as a crucial 
component that judges must take into consideration. In other 
words, simply viewing contractual relations between parties as 
an incidence of free will and intention, not only obscures but 
also ossifies the inequality of bargaining power that are at times 
embedded in economic relations.7 In addition to other 
principles in the law of contract, good faith continues to provide 
a valuable tool to address the imbalance of power in contractual 
relations, particularly in the context of developing countries 
like Nigeria.  
Following this introduction, in Part I, I examine the 
doctrine of good faith under two rubrics: the 
traditional/piecemeal and contemporary approaches. Whereas 
the traditional/piecemeal approach broadly refers to the pre-
Bhasin era approach to good faith – which has continued in 
many jurisdiction, the contemporary approach is undertaken 
primarily by examining Bhasin’s case. In Part II, I turn to the 
extant application of the duty of good faith under Nigerian law 
of contract by examining the cases where the doctrine has been 
applied – the outcome being that there is no coherence in how 
the courts have implied or applied the doctrine of good faith 
 
 7 See: Peer Zumabansen, ‘The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract’ 
[2007] 14:2 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 191-223. 
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under Nigerian law of contract. In Part III, following the 
analysis of the Nigerian cases, I ask which way forward: that is, 
should the Nigerian courts recognize the development in Bhasin 
or not? In the conclusion, I summarize the core arguments in 
the paper and the rationale for the case that the Nigerian courts 
should carry on with the traditional/piecemeal approach. 
II.  THE CONCEPT OF GOOD FAITH – A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
The quest to define ‘good faith’ has informed the ‘locking 
of horns’ by established contract law scholars in the past years.8 
It has, indeed, been asserted that the concept is devoid of any 
precise definition.9 The imprecision of the good faith concept 
speaks more to its broad and diverse application in the law of 
contract, than a limitation per se. In the ensuing sub-section, I 
synthesize the traditional understanding of good faith.10 It is 
important to highlight that the traditional approach to good 
faith most accords with the contemporary application in 
Nigerian law. This is then followed by an examination of the 
contemporary approach via the decision in Bhasin.11 
 
 8 See for example the summary of the debates among Professors Robert 
Summers, Steven Burton and Allan Farnsworth on the meaning of ‘good faith’ in the 
United States in Farnsworth, (n 1) 161 – 163. 
 9 Robert Summers, ‘Good Faith in General Contract Law and the Sales 
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code’ [1968] 54:2 Va. L Rev 195, 196. See also 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey decision in Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v Route 
18 Shopping Centre Associates, 864 A. 2d 387 (N.J. 2005), where the court noted that 
“good faith is a concept that defies precise definition”. 
 10 For a very concise synthesis of the pre-Bhasin era in Canadian law of 
Contract, see: John McCamus, ‘The Implied Duty to Perform in Good Faith’ in The 
Law of Contracts, (Toronto, 2nd edn, Irwin Law 2012) 835 – 868. 
 11 For cases that have attempted to apply Bhasin, see: Salvation Army v Angus 
Partnership Inc. [2018] AJ No 688, 2018 ABCA 206; Atos IT Solutions and Services GMBH 
v Sapient Canada Inc. [2018] OJ No. 2064, 2018 ONCA 374; IFP Technologies (Canada) 
Inc v EnCana Midstream and Marketing [2017] AJ No. 666, 2017 ABCA 157. 
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A. The Traditional Approach 
Often criticized as incoherent and vague, the traditional 
analysis of the doctrine of good faith is developed based on the 
commonalities from the various cases where the principle has 
been invoked. From the various analyses, some features 
emerge. First, honesty is an often referenced ‘expression’ of 
good faith.12 The concept, however, transcends ‘honesty’. It 
includes ‘fair dealing’ and ‘reasonableness’ or conduct that is 
not contrary to the community standards of honesty, 
reasonableness and fairness.13 More normative expressions of 
good faith have also been identified. For example, according to 
FDJ Brand, Judge of the South African Supreme Court of 
Appeal: 
[I]in South African legal parlance, the concept of bona fides or 
good faith has acquired a meaning wider than mere honesty 
or the absence of subjective bad faith. According to the 
extended meaning, it has an objective content which includes 
 
 12 See: Article 1 of the American Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) where 
good faith is defined as “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned”. 
UCC, 1 – 201(19). 
 13 Article 2 of the UCC, defined ‘good faith’ in the case of a merchant to mean 
“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing in trade”. See: UCC 2 – 103(1)(b). And as Ian McNeil notes: 
[T]he essence of good faith in any society is adherence to the common contract norms. 
If a person has sufficiently met those norms in any given instance – something that 
can never be determined except in a particular social context – the person has acted 
in good faith; if the person has not met those norms, he has not acted in good faith. 
 Ian MacNeil, ‘Values in Contract: Internal and External’ [1983 – 1984] 78:2 Northw. 
L. Rev., 340 – 341, 342 footnote 21. 
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other abstract values such as justice, reasonableness, fairness 
and equity.14  
Second, good faith is an exclusionary concept. It is a 
phrase without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and 
serves to exclude a wide range of heterogenous forms of bad 
faith.15 In Robert Summers’ view, good faith “takes on specific 
and variant meanings by way of contrast with the specific and 
variant forms of bad faith which judges decide to prohibit”.16 
Some Nigerian courts have adopted a similar reason to that 
posited by Robert Summers in defining good faith. In Shodeinde 
& Ors. v. Registered Trustees of the Ahmadiyya, the Supreme Court 
of Nigeria defined good faith as “the absence of bad faith – of 
mala fides”.17 In the latter case of Akaninwo & Ors. v. Nsirim & 
Ors, the highest court described bad faith as projecting: 
[A] sinister motive designed to mislead or deceive another … 
(it) is more than bad judgment or mere negligence. It is a 
conscious doing of a wrong arising from dishonest purpose or 
 
 14 See: FDJ Brand, ‘The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South 
African Law of Contract: The Influenced of the Common Law and the Constitution’ 
[2009] 126 SALJ 71, 73. 
 15 Summers, ‘Good Faith in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code’ (n 6) 201. 
 16 ibid 202. Examples of these excluded forms of bad faith include: the 
concealing of defect in a product sold, willful failure to perform in full, open abuse 
of bargaining power, deliberate prevention of other party’s consummation of a deal, 
lack of diligence in mitigating other party’s damages, arbitrary and capricious 
exercise of power to terminate, “overreaching interpretation of contract language”, 
and harassment for repeated assurances of performance. 
 17 Shodeinde & Ors. v Regd. Trustees of the Ahmadiyya [1983] LPELR – 3064 (SC), 
53 – 54. 
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moral obliquity. Mala fide is not a mistake or error but a 
deliberate wrong emanating from ill-will.18 
In relation to conceptual clarification, it is difficult to see 
how Summers’ approach, which the Nigerian approach 
mirrors, provides greater clarity to an attempt to define good 
faith. Indeed, the approach has been criticized as being 
“tantamount to saying that the good faith duty is breached 
whenever a judge decides that it has been breached. This hardly 
advances the cause of intellectual inquiry and it provides 
absolutely no guide to the disposition of future cases…”19 
Steven Burton notes that with this approach “…good faith 
performance consequently appears as a license for the exercise 
of judicial or juror intuition, and presumably results in 
unpredictable and inconsistent applications”.20 
Third, good faith has also been construed simply as a 
‘gap-filler’; “a rechristening of fundamental principles of 
contract law”.21 It has been suggested that it is in this sense that 
most common law scholars and lawyers appreciate ‘good 
faith’.22 While admitting to the narrowness of this conception, 
Farnsworth opined that “the chief utility of the concept of good 
faith performance has always been as a rationale in a process 
which is not entrusted to the trier of the facts – that of implying 
 
 18 Akaninwo & Ors. v Nsirim & Ors. (2008) LPELR – 321 (SC), 43 paras D – F. 
 19 Michael Bridge, ‘Does Anglo-Canadian Contract Law Need a Doctrine of 
Good Faith?’ [1984] 9:4 CBLJ 385, 398. 
 20 Steven Burton, ‘Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform 
in Good Faith’ (1980) 94 Harv. L Rev 369, 369 – 370.  
 21 See: Tymshare Inc v. Covell 727 F. 2d, 1145 - 1152 (DC Cir 1984) (Scalia J); 
Farnsworth (n 1) 161 – 163. 
 22 ibid 161. 
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contract terms”.23 Farnsworth’s approach can be viewed as a 
response to the alleged subjectivity of Summers’ ‘excluder’ 
concept. For Farnsworth, good faith as an incidence of implied 
terms “can be measured by an objective standard based on the 
decency, fairness or reasonableness of the community, 
commercial or otherwise, of which one is a member” as against 
“the individual’s own beliefs as to what might be decent, fair or 
reasonable. Both common sense and tradition dictate an 
objective standard for good faith performance”.24  
Like Farnsworth, John McCamus argues that good faith 
might be construed by ‘stitching’ together the “existing rules of 
common law that appear to implement the good faith duty”.25 
Seeking to clarify the conceptual challenge therefore, McCamus 
proposed that the duty of good faith might be defined as: (1) the 
duty to exercise discretionary powers conferred by contract 
reasonably and for the intended purpose; (2) the duty to 
cooperate in securing performance of the main objects of the 
contract; and (3) the duty to refrain from strategic behavior 
designed to evade contractual obligations.26 The limitation of 
McCamus’s proposed definitions is that they were derived from 
his tri-categorization of cases where Canadian courts have 
invoked the duty of good faith. Beyond, the Canadian courts, 
 
 23 Allan Farnsworth, ‘Good Faith Performance and Commercial 
Reasonableness under the Uniform Commercial Code’ [1963] 30 U. Chi L Rev 666, 
672. 
 24 ibid 671 - 672. Another writer has similarly argued that “good faith is simply 
another embodiment of the basic principle of contract law – the protection of 
reasonable expectations” see: Jay Feinman, ‘Good Faith and Reasonable 
Expectations’ [2014] 67 Arkansas Law Review 525, 526. 
 25 McCamus, ‘The Implied Duty to Perform in Good Faith’ (n 7) 863. 
 26 ibid. See also: John McCamus, ‘Abuse of Discretion, Failure to Cooperate 
and Evasion of Duty: Unpacking the Common Law Duty of Good Faith Contractual 
Performance’ [2004] 29 The Advocates Quarterly 72, 77 – 90. 
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their application may be limited to the extent that different 
socio-economic and political contexts have impact on the 
performance of contractual arrangements. 
While the foregoing synthesis of the traditional approach 
to good faith underscores the claim that the trajectory of the 
concept of good faith is “confusing and disorganized” is 
perhaps not an exaggeration,27 I contend that the piecemeal 
approach to the development of good faith in the traditional era 
can also be understood based on the diverse categories of 
commercial disputes that the courts had to deal with. In my 
view, the inherent advantage of this approach is its flexibility. 
It does not require the judges to fit into any established category 
or exclude any cause of action so easily. Despite what one may 
describe as its limitations, the Nigerian courts continue to apply 
the traditional approach. I will get to this shortly. 
B.  The Contemporary Approach: Bhasin v. Hrynew 
In Bhasin, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) was 
presented with an opportunity to make the traditional 
“piecemeal, unsettled and unclear” state of law on good faith 
“more coherent and more just” – at least according to the SCC.28 
The decision prompted an “incrementally radical evolution” in 
the Canadian law of contract on good faith;29 to wit, the 
endorsement of good faith as a general organizing principle of 
 
 27 Jacob Young, ‘Justice Beneath the Palms: Bhasin v. Hrynew and the Role of 
Good Faith in Canadian Contract Law’ [2016] 79 Sask LJ 79, 82. 
 28 Bhasin (n 2) [32] - [33]. 
 29 For some critical analyses of this decision, see: Joseph T. Robertson, ‘Good 
Faith as an Organizing Principle in Contract Law: Bhasin v. Hrynew – Two Steps 
Forward and One Look Back’ [2015] 93 Can Bar Rev, 809-866; Angela Swan, ‘The 
obligation to Perform in Good Faith: Comment on Bhasin v Hrynew’ [2015] 56 Can 
Bus LJ, 395; Jacob Young (n 27) 80.  
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the common law of contract and the recognition of the duty of 
honest contractual performance.30 The impact of the decision 
has also been felt beyond the borders of Canada, with courts in 
New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom, to varying 
degrees, considering the implications and applicability of the 
decision in their jurisdictions.31 
Bhasin revolved around a contractual relationship 
between Mr. Bhasin (the Appellant) and Canadian American 
Financial Corporation (Can-Am) and events surrounding the 
termination of the relationship by Can-Am. This contractual 
arrangement involved the appellant serving as a retail 
enrollment director for Can-Am, a company which deals in 
education saving plans.32 The contract, inter alia, entailed an 
automatically renewable successive terms of three years subject 
to either parties’ 6 months notification in writing of the party’s 
desire to terminate the contract.33 Another relevant term in the 
agreement is the “entire agreement clause”, which in effect 
constricted the terms governing the relationship to the 
explicitly stated terms in the contract.34 Mr. Hrynew, one of 
 
 30 Bhasin (n 2) [33]. 
 31 For example, although eventually overturned by the English Court of 
Appeal (CA), a Queens Bench Division decision in 2015 citing Bhasin affirmed the 
principle of good faith as the general organizing principle of the common law of 
contract. The decision was however overturned on appeal, with the English CA 
instead indicating preference for the traditional piecemeal application of the 
principle. See generally: MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co v Cottonex Anstalt [2015] All 
ER (D) 172 (Feb); MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. v. Cottonex Anstalt, [2016] 
EWCA Civ 789. See also: Paul Davis, ‘English Court of Appeal Rejects the 
“Organizing Principle of Good Faith”‘ (Canadian Appeals Monitor, 5 December 2016) 
<https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/blogs/canadian-appeals-monitor/english-
court-appeal-rejects-organizing-principle-good-faith>. 
 32 Bhasin (n 2) [6]. 
 33 ibid [4]. 
 34 ibid [25]. 
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Can-Am’s enrollment director and a competitor to the appellant 
was said to be on good terms with the Alberta Securities 
Commission (ASC).35 Both Mr. Hrynew and the appellant had 
an acrimonious history due to the former’s rejection of the 
latter’s proposals for a merger.36 Following ASC’s compliance 
queries in respect of some of Can-Am’s enrollment directors 
and the requirement that the company appoints a single 
provincial trading officer (PTO) to audit the enrollment 
directors, the company appointed Mr. Hrynew. Naturally, the 
appellant objected to having Mr. Hrynew, a competitor, entitled 
to access and review its business records.37 In a bid to prevent 
the revocation of its licence by the ASC, Can-Am informed the 
ASC about the restructuring plan of its operations in Alberta, 
which included the subsuming of the appellant’s agency under 
Mr. Hrynew’s establishment. Apart from not informing the 
appellant of this plan, Can-Am was untruthful with the 
appellant on the merger plans and the conditions under which 
Mr. Hrynew will operate as PTO.38 As a result of the appellant’s 
refusal to allow the PTO access to his books, Can-Am triggered 
the expiration process.  
Based on these facts, the appellant argued that the 
actions of the respondents (Can-Am and Hrynew) constituted a 
breach of the duties of good faith and honest performance and 
amounted to conspiracy and unlawful inducement of breach of 
contract. In opposition, the respondents argued that the good 
faith duty only features in limited types of contract, to the 
exclusion of the type of contract with the appellant. Further, the 
 
 35 ibid [8]. 
 36 ibid [9]. 
 37 ibid [10]. 
 38 ibid [12]. 
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contract between parties expressly provides for how a 
termination will be triggered. More so, the contract explicitly 
forbids reliance on extrinsic terms; hence, disallowing implied 
conditions. The trial court agreed with the appellant, holding in 
the main that, while the contract between the appellant and 
Can-Am did not come under categories previously recognised 
as covered by the duty of good faith, it was analogous to some 
of those categories, to wit, franchise and employment contracts. 
It further held that good faith can be implied from the intentions 
of the parties “in order to give business efficacy to the 
agreement” and exclusion clauses will not be given effect to 
when it is unjust and inequitable to do so.39 The Court of Appeal 
however disagreed with the trial court and accordingly 
overturned the decision. The court held that there was no 
analogous comparison between the extant contract and 
employment and franchise contracts, and more so, implied 
terms are inapplicable in the face of terms expressly contained 
in a contract.40 It is worthy of note that the pro and anti duty of 
good faith positions of the two lower courts are indicative of the 
historical dispositions of both levels of courts to the principle. 
As noted elsewhere, it has been empirically demonstrated that 
“trial-level courts are more willing to grapple with a broader 
application of good faith than appellate level courts”.41  
In holding that there was a breach of duty of good faith, 
the SCC canvassed “two incremental steps”. First, the SCC 
recognized good faith as a “general organizing principle42 of the 
 
 39 ibid [24]. 
 40 ibid [27] – [28]. 
 41 McCamus (n 25) 91; Young (n 28) 86. 
 42 The court defined ‘organizing principle’ as stating “in general terms a 
requirement of justice from which more specific legal doctrines may be derived” 
Bhasin (n 2) [64]. 
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common law of contract which underpins and informs the 
various rules in which the common law, in various situations 
and types of relationships, recognizes obligations of good faith 
contractual performance”.43 Beyond  describing the principle 
simply as parties performing “their contractual duties honestly 
and reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily”,44 the SCC 
deliberately refrained from delineating the limits or scope of the 
general organizing principle.45 Rather, the Court held that the 
principle “is not a free-standing rule, but … a standard that …is 
manifested in more specific legal doctrines and may be given 
different weight in different situations”.46 Further muddying 
the already murky pool is the Court’s explanation that the 
principle compels “a contracting party (to) have appropriate 
regard to the legitimate contractual interests of the contracting 
partner”.47 The Court held that ‘appropriate regard’ is context 
dependent, and while it “requires that a party not seek to 
undermine those (contractual) interests in bad faith”, it does not 
entail acting to serve the interest of such party in all cases.48 The 
court also stated that the organizing principle must of necessity 
fall within existing doctrines in which the law mandates 
“honest, candid, forthright or reasonable contractual 
 
 43 Bhasin (n 2) [33]; Chris Hunt, ‘Good Faith Performance in Canadian Contract 
Law’ [2015] CLJ, 7; Hall, (n 2) 336. 
 44 Bhasin (n 2) [63]. 
 45 The court noted that rather than have a close list of situations coming under 
the good faith bracket, the application of the principle to specific situations “should 
be developed where the law is found to be wanting and where the development may 
occur in a way that is consistent with the structure of the common law of contracts 
and gives due weight to the importance of private ordering and certainty in 
commercial affairs” ibid [66]. 
 46 Bhasin (n 2) [64]. 
 47 ibid [65]. 
 48 ibid. 
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performance”.49 In addition, the Court affirmed that the 
application of the principle calls for “a highly context-specific 
understanding of what honesty and reasonableness in 
performance” require.50 Lastly, the Court articulated an 
important caveat to the effect that applying the principle is not 
a fiat to engage in “ad hoc judicial moralism or “palm tree” 
justice”, neither should it be used as “pretext for scrutinizing 
the motives of contracting parties”.51 
Second, the SCC created a general duty of honesty in 
contractual performance under the “umbrella of the organizing 
principle”.52 This duty obliges parties not to lie or knowingly 
mislead another on issues directly linked to the performance of 
the contract.53 According to the SCC, this duty should not be 
equated with a “duty of disclosure or fiduciary loyalty”.54 This 
new duty is solely performance-oriented, operates as a matter 
of law, and can therefore not be excluded by explicit contractual 
 
 49 ibid [66]. 
 50 ibid [69]. 
 51 The court further held that “a party may sometimes cause loss to another – 
even intentionally – in the legitimate pursuit pf economic self-interest” ibid, [70] – 
[71]. 
 52 ibid [72] – [73]. 
 53 ibid [73]. 
 54 ibid [85]. The court further distinguished between “failure to disclose a 
material fact” and “active dishonesty”. While the new duty entails the later, it does 
not include the former. See: Yam Seng (n 4) [86]. The court elsewhere employed the 
descriptors “actively misleading or deceiving the other contracting party”. See: Yam 
Seng (n 4) [87]. It has however been noted elsewhere that in identifying some of the 
dishonesties of Can-Am, the court “crossed the line into breach … by equivocating 
rather than plainly lying…” See John McCamus, ‘The New General Principle of Good 
Faith Performance and the New “Rule of Law” of Honesty in Performance in 
Canadian Contract Law’ [2015] 32 Journal of Contract Law 103, 114. 
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terms.55 Although, parties cannot exclude the duty of honest 
performance from their contract, the Court recognised parties’ 
right to, via express terms in their contracts, “relax the 
requirements of the doctrine so long as they respect its 
minimum core”.56  
Bhasin has been said to raise “more questions than it 
answers”.57 These unanswered questions include: what does 
good faith mean? While it is clear that the new duty to act 
honestly is by operation of law, from whence do other good faith 
‘affiliates’ like ‘reasonableness’ emanate?58 Similarly, what 
decisions qualify as exercise of a contractual discretion and can 
a good faith obligation override an express and unambiguous 
provision of a contract?59 Again, do the guiding principle and 
duty of honest performance extend beyond the performance of 
a contact, does it for instance, cover the negotiation phase?60  
 
 55 Yam Seng (n 4) [73] – [75]. See also: Lisa Peters, ‘Tell Me No Lies – The New 
Duty of Honesty in Contractual Performance’ (December 10th, 2014) 
<https://www.lawsonlundell.com/the-business-law-blog/tell-me-no-lies-the-new-
duty> 3 – 4. 
 56 Yam Seng (n 4) [77] – [78]. While the court did not expressly define what it 
meant by “minimum core”, it noted elsewhere that “contracting parties must be able 
to rely on a minimum standard of honesty … as a reassurance that if the contract 
does not work out, they will have a fair opportunity to protect their interest” [86]. 
 57 Krish Maharaj, ‘An Action on the Equities: Re-Characterizing Bhasin as 
Equitable Estoppel’ [2017] 55:1 Alta L Rev 199. 
 58 As noted by Young, the refusal of Justice Cromwell to “clarify whether a 
good faith term can be implied-in-law or implied-in-fact, or what does two concepts 
mean in relation to each other” was “a missed opportunity”. See: Young (n 27) 105. 
It however appears that courts have engaged Bhasin as authority that good faith 
should not be considered as implied or express terms, but rather as a doctrine, hence, 
same cannot be excluded by parties. See: High Tower Homes Corporation v. Stevens 2014 
ONCA 911, 328 OAC 265 referenced in Robertson (n 29) 856. 
 59 Robertson (n 29) 816 – 817. 
 60 See: Tamara Buckwold, ‘The Enforceability of Agreements to Negotiate in 
Good Faith: The Impact of Bhasin v. Hrynew and the Organizing Principle of Good 
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In a particularly biting critique of the judgment, Young 
stated that, post-Bhasin, good faith “remains nothing more than 
a boilerplate addition to pleadings and a superfluous addition 
to what proponents of the classical model believed was an 
already capable bundle of doctrines”.61 In Angela Swan’s view, 
the decision meant nothing more than to refrain from lying and 
that “Cromwell J. just fathered a number of separate instances 
into his “general organizing principle”“.62  And, to Joseph 
Robertson, Bhasin has a narrow “precedential significance”.63 It 
is also interesting to note the other interpretations by scholars 
who have analyzed Bhasin. For instance, while Angela Swan is 
of the view that the SCC, in Bhasin, developed the duty of good 
faith as a non-implied term,64 Young opines that “Bhasin, cannot 
… be taken as striking down the previous jurisprudence with 
respect to implied terms of good faith…”65 The criticisms 
regardless, scholars have been charitable enough to point to 
some of the positives of Bhasin. For example, whereas Young 
argues that Bhasin’s significance is to move “the common law of 
 
Faith in Common Law Canada’ (April 6th, 2016) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2758844> , 1. 
 61 Young (n 27) 108. 
 62 Angela Swan, ‘The Obligation to Perform in Good Faith: Comment on 
Bhasin v. Hrynew’ [2015] 56:3 Can Bus LJ 395, 403, referenced in Young, (n 28) 108; 
Angela Swan, ‘Good Faith in Contract Performance: Bhasin v. Hrynew Two Years 
On’ (April 28th, 2017) < 
https://www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/csrinstitute/pdf/Angela-Swan-Bhasin-
Two%20Years%20On-Session%20Two%20April%202-2017.pdf>, 3. 
 63 Robertson (n 29) 864. 
 64 Angela Swan, ‘The Obligation to Perform in Good Faith: Comment on 
Bhasin v. Hrynew’ [2015] 56:3 Can Bus LJ 395, 403. 
 65 Young, (n 27) 106. 
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contract in Canada closer to full rationality”;66 Robertson, 
despite his critique, opines that the decision provides “a solid 
foundation upon which the tenets of the good faith doctrine can 
be applied in such a manner that certainty and predictability in 
the law are preserved”.67  
The foregoing critiques and commentaries must not be 
taken to have undersold and undervalued the decision.68 When 
situated in the context of Cromwell J.’s stated agenda in Bhasin 
as well as the limited precedential value it has generated so far, 
the significance of these critiques becomes more evident. 
Starting out, Cromwell J., articulated the overarching objective 
of the ‘Bhasin principle’ as making the common law of contract 
“less unsettled and piecemeal, more coherent and more just”.69 
It is on this scale, that Bhasin can be most fairly assessed. Simply 
restated, has Bhasin made the common law of contract more 
coherent and more just or does it have the potential to? While 
the actual effect of Bhasin on cases will warrant an empirical 
research on how courts have applied it over a reasonable period 
of time, based on the current evidence, it is contestable that the 
decision indeed has the potential of making the common law of 
contract more coherent, cohesive and just.70 For example, 
 
 66 Young construes ‘full rationality’ as lying in ‘substantive rationality’: “the 
notion that people should be able to rely on each other to act fairly, honestly, and be 
mutually cooperative…” ibid 109. 
 67 Robertson (n 29) 866. 
 68 Daniele Bertolini, ‘Decomposing Bhasin v Hrynew : Towards an institutional 
understanding of the general organizing principle of good faith in contractual 
performance’ [2017] 67 RDUT 3, 348-410. 
 69 Bhasin (n 2) [32] – [34]. 
 70 For cases that have attempted to apply Bhasin, see: Salvation Army v Angus 
Partnership Inc. [2018] AJ No 688, 2018 ABCA 206; Atos IT Solutions and Services GMBH 
v Sapient Canada Inc. [2018] OJ No. 2064, 2018 ONCA 374; IFP Technologies (Canada) 
Inc v EnCana Midstream and Marketing [2017] AJ No. 666, 2017 ABCA 157. 
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according to a 2016 analysis of post-Bhasin cases where it had 
been cited over one thousand times before the courts, the 
authors concluded that “despite the excitement Bhasin incited, 
evidenced by the volume of cases citing the decision after its 
release, appellate courts have narrowly construed the duty of 
honest contractual performance.”71 
Two new developments, courtesy Bhasin, are worth 
noting in this regard. First, the decision has broken down the 
wall of separation of previous categorisations of contractual 
situations where good faith is applicable or not. In other words, 
parties cannot by express agreement contract themselves out of 
good faith in the performance of their agreements.72 Second, 
through the development of the ‘duty of honest performance’, 
the decision provided an avenue for courts to make incremental 
improvements where existing principles are insufficient.73 It is 
in this regard that despite agreeing with the Court of Appeal 
that the facts of the case do not come under existing categories 
where good faith has been recognized, the SCC formulated a 
new rule of honest performance admitting of the said facts was 
formulated. For all its claim to a fundamental change in 
Canadian common law of contract doctrine of good faith, Bhasin 
so far has been a modest incremental step. 
 
 71 Cynthia Spry, Julia Webster and Morgan Westgate, ‘Appellate Court 
Treatment of Bhasin v. Hrynew: The Developing Duty of Good Faith in 2016’ 1:1 
Commercial & Business Litigation Review 1-4, 4. 
 72 For an early application of Bhasin, see: 0856464 B.C. Ltd. v TimberWest Forest 
[2014] BCSC 2433 (CanLII) 
 73 On the extension of the duty of honesty in Bhasin to contract formation, see: 
Paulus v. Fleury [2018] O.J. NO. 906; ONSC 1188, [58] (T. A. Heeney J.) “While [the 
principle in Bhasin], strictly speaking, applies to the performance of contracts, as 
opposed to their formation, [the principle has been] applied both to the negotiation 
of a contract as well as to its performance.”. Also see Antunes v Limen Structure Ltd., 
[2015] ONSC 2163. 
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III.  GOOD FAITH IN THE NIGERIAN LAW OF CONTRACT: A 
PIECEMEAL APPROACH  
Good faith has not been a subject of robust judicial or 
scholarly discourse in Nigeria. Nigeria’s leading text on the law 
of contract74 only made a remote reference to ‘contracts 
uberrimae fidei’ in the context of exceptions to the non-disclosure 
rule on misrepresentation.75 In this section, based on the 
analysis of some cases, I ask to what extent does Nigerian law 
recognize duties of good faith in the performance of contracts? 
In the limited cases where the question of good faith has arisen, 
the Nigerian courts have simply resolved those disputes on a 
piecemeal basis. From the analyses of the cases below, the 
outcome is that the Nigerian courts have followed the 
traditional approach, that is, good faith under Nigerian law of 
contract does not have a coherent, technical or established 
meaning outside of the requirement to act honestly, without 
malice or fraud. Beyond this, the concept remains ambivalent 
and susceptible to the charge of incoherence. The contemporary 
application of good faith in Nigeria is thus akin to the pre-
Bhasin era in Canada. I will now turn to a consideration of some 
of these cases.76 
In Williams v. Williams,77 a dispute ensued among 
brothers in respect of their deceased father’s estate. After a 
period of conflict, the brothers had recourse to mediation, and 
subsequently entered an agreement which confirms that their 
 
 74 I.E, Sagay, Nigerian Law of Contract (Ibadan, 2nd edn, Spectrum Books 
Limited 2001). 
 75 ibid 305 – 308. 
 76 My analysis of the Nigerian caselaw excludes the analysis of “good faith” 
in Insurance contracts. 
 77 [2014] LPELR – 22642 (CA), 42 – 43. See also: Zenith Bank Plc v. Arthur John 
[2012] LPELR – 21295 (CA); Jadesinmi v. Egbe [2003] 10 NWLR (Pt. 827) 1. 
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father died intestate having revoked every testamentary 
disposition made by him before his death. The agreement 
contained a sharing formula for the estate and provided that 
any dispute arising therefrom will be referred to arbitration. 
Subsequently, some of the brothers claimed to have discovered 
a holographic will deposited by their father at the court’s 
registry. They approached the court to give effect to the will. 
The remaining brothers opposed and applied to the court to 
refer the action to arbitration as agreed. The trial court agreed 
with the Plaintiffs that construing the terms of the contract 
strictly, the arbitration clause did not pertain to the newly 
discovered will on which the action is founded, but just the 
terms of the agreement. They further argued that the agreement 
was obtained by misrepresentation and concealment of 
material facts, i.e. the existence of the holographic will. In 
overruling the decision of the trial court, the Nigerian Court of 
Appeal (NCA) held: 
An agreement voluntarily entered by parties such as in this 
case, must of necessity be honoured in good faith … Where 
therefore the words in an agreement are clear, precise and 
unambiguous, the court shall without much ado expound 
those words in their ordinary and natural sense in order to 
give a true and genuine effect to the intention of the parties … 
In the instant case, given that the parties in the appeal decide 
to enter into an amicable family agreement … It accords with 
morality and good conscience for the parties concerned to 
abide by the terms of the said family agreement in the event 
of any subsequent development which might have been 
unforeseen like the alleged emergence of (the holographic 
will).78  
 
 78 ibid 42 – 43. 
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The Williams’ decision essentially endorsed the settled 
common law position on the sanctity of contract and the 
imperatives of adhering to contractual terms. The standard is 
not just to honour or perform a contract, but to do so, ‘in good 
faith’. From Williams’ case, the concealment of the holographic 
will was crucial to the decision of the appellate court. Beyond 
this, one might however ask if the inclusion of the phrase ‘in 
good faith’ is superfluous or raises the obligation of a party to a 
contract to perform a contractual duty in a way or manner that 
exceeds its explicit terms. Or posed differently, is there any 
good faith element in the Williams’ case, which if absent, the 
court might have reached a different conclusion? It is indeed 
difficult to answer these questions from Williams, as the court 
only went with the literal interpretation of the agreement, 
although it referenced good faith. But what does the phrase 
‘honoured in good faith’ mean? Does it mean honoured 
‘without dishonesty or reprehensibility’ or ‘strictly performed 
according to the terms of a contract’? These questions are key to 
appreciating the approach and understanding of Nigerian 
courts to the doctrine of good faith. These questions, and the 
foregoing points, are best considered under various factual 
contexts in which Nigerian courts have engaged the good faith 
principle whether tacitly or directly.        
A.  Mortgages  
The Nigerian approach to good faith in the context of 
mortgages is best represented by West African Breweries Ltd. v. 
Savannah Ventures Ltd (WAB Ltd.)79 The crux of this action 
revolves around an allegation of bad faith on the part of a 
receiver in relation to the undervaluation and sale of the assets 
 
 79 [2002] LPELR – SC. 180/1997. 
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of North Brewery Plc under receivership. The appellant was a 
50% equity holder of North Brewery and the Nigerian Federal 
Government held the remaining 50%. The government 
indicated its interest to sell its holding, and the appellant 
indicated its interest in procuring it. In the course of its 
negotiation to buy the government’s interest, the creditor, UBA 
Plc., acting for a conglomerate of creditors, exercised its power 
under a debenture deed and appointed one Hassan 
Abdulraman as receiver/manager. The receiver agreed with the 
debtor that it would keep the brewery running and retain the 
General Manager and company staff. Rather than keeping to his 
word, the receiver sacked the General Manager, and 
subsequently, decided to sell some assets of the debtor to 
Savannah Ventures Ltd. (respondent) with the agreement that 
the respondent will be responsible for making good North 
Brewery’s debts to other creditors. The debtor’s auditors 
conducted two audits in 1986 and 1990 putting the values of the 
company for both years at N39,691,000 and N158,848,000, 
respectively. Rather than relying on these reports, the receiver 
commissioned another auditor in 1991 which assessed the 
company’s asset at N59,724,920. The receiver was aware that 
the appellant had agreed to pay off the debtor’s indebtedness 
after conclusion of the sale agreement and had proceeded to 
pay for the federal government’s equity. After the appellant 
discovered that some of the assets of the debtor had been sold 
to the respondent, it initiated an action contending that the 
receiver acted in bad faith particularly based on the 
undervaluation of assets. 
At the court of first instance, it was held that the 
receiver’s conduct was “…suggestive or admit of fraud and 
collusion and have thereby seriously eroded, dented and cast 
unlimited doubts and aspersions on the bona fide of the 
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(receiver).”80 At the Court of Appeal, the decision was 
overturned on the ground that “no paragraph of the pleadings 
provided a basis for the numerous serious findings made by the 
learned trial judge”.81 On further appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria (SCN) overruled the Court of Appeal and re-affirmed 
the decision of the trial court.  
The SCN identified the issue of undervaluation as the 
core of the dispute thereby centering good faith. Relying on the 
decision of Kay J. in Warner v. Jacob82, the House of Lords’ 
decision in Kennedy v. De Trafford83 and its previous decision in 
Ekaeteh v. NHDS Ltd. & Anor.,84 the SCN held that  
[T]he only obligation incumbent on a mortgagee selling under 
and in pursuance of a power of sale in the mortgage deed is 
that he should act in good faith”. “… lack of good faith cannot 
be stated with … precision. Lack of good faith covers a 
multitude of conduct having, I venture to think, dishonesty or 
reprehensibility as common elements”.85 
According to the SCN, when good faith is in issue in a 
mortgage transaction, collusion with a purchaser must be 
proved.  In particular, the SCN held that: 
[T]he same strictness that apply to an allegation of fraud does 
not, …, apply to an allegation of bad faith, even though an 
allegation of bad faith is sometimes held to be equivalent to 
an allegation of dishonesty … For my part, I do not think that 
 
 80 ibid. 
 81 ibid. 
 82 [1882] 20 Ch D 220. 
 83 [1897] AC 180. 
 84 [1973] NSCC 373, 381. 
 85 (n 79) 31. 
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an allegation of lack of good faith always necessarily implies 
dishonesty, even though allegation of dishonesty will imply 
absence of good faith … In this case, the general good faith of 
the receiver had been impugned … the sale at gross 
undervalue and the lack of preciseness in the statement of the 
obligation of the supposed purchaser are all aspects and 
manifestations of the absence of good faith. . . . 
It is clear from the evidence before the court that to 
achieve his aim, the receiver threw caution and fairness to the 
wind … There is abundant evidence that the receiver was 
clearly grossly negligent and reckless in dealing with the 
properties of the North Breweries. It cannot be said that he acted 
in good faith.86 
It is worth noting that although the SCN tacitly held that 
the sale was at gross undervalue, it did not emphasize the 
position of the law on a mortgagee acting in what he considers 
to be its best interest. It appears that in reaching its decision, the 
existence of a better arrangement to make good the 
indebtedness of the company, and the defendants’ acceptance 
of an offer which was gravely inimical to the company, 
impacted the court’s decision. In a sense therefore, the interest 
of the mortgagee does not appear to be the sole consideration 
of the court, marking a slight shift in the application of the duty 
of good faith in Nigerian mortgage transaction.  
To reiterate the overlap between the approach by the 
Nigerian SCN and the traditional analysis of good faith 
developed by Summers for example, it can be argued that the 
receiver’s – and by extension mortgagee’s – actions, amounts to 
a “conscious lack of diligence in mitigating” the damages of the 
 
 86 ibid 33. 
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other parties.87 However, in the context of mortgage 
transactions, subsequent decisions of Nigerian courts have not 
recognized or given effect to the more liberal application of the 
good faith duty.88  
B.  Admiralty Contracts 
Another category of commercial agreements where the 
Nigerian Court has dealt with good faith is in respect of 
admiralty contracts where, as a specie of international business 
transactions, the ‘choice of law’ clauses are of critical 
importance.89 In Sonnar (Nig.) Ltd. & Anor. v. Partenreedri M.S. 
Nordwind Owners of the Ship M.V. Nordwind & Anor (Sonnar)90, 
the SCN departed from the express term of a contract in relation 
to the choice of law on the ground of good faith. The Plaintiffs, 
Nigerian companies, sue for damages for breach of contract in 
respect of goods that were not delivered in Lagos from Bangkok 
on board the M.V. Nordwind. The first Defendant, owners of 
the M.V. Nordwind carries on their business as shipowners in 
Germany, whereas the second Defendant, Barbridge Shipping 
Company is based in Liberia and it issued the Bill of Lading that 
 
 87 (n 15) 203. 
 88 See for examples, Babatunde & Anor. v Bank of the North Ltd. & Ors. SC. 
350A/2002, SC. 350/2002 (Consolidated) and Salami v WEMA Bank Nig. PLC & Ors. 
[2009] LPELR – 8875 (CA). 
 89 See: Lehman Brothers Comm. Corp v Minmetals Int’l Nonferrons Metal Trading 
Co.; No. 94 Civ. 8301, 2000 WL 1702039 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000) – a decision of the 
Federal Court in the Southern District of New York that brought to the fore the 
proposition that choice of law clauses in commercial agreements are no longer 
viewed as conclusive or absolute. In the context of unequal bargaining powers and 
choice of law, see the Canadian case of Douez v. Facebook, Inc. 2017 SCC 33. 
 90 [1987] LPELR – 3494 (SC); [1987] 4 NWLR (Pt. 66), 520. 
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contained the disputed choice of law clause in this case.91 The 
implication of Clause 3 of the Bill of Lading is that in the event 
of any dispute, recourse will be made to arbitration, with 
Germany and German law being the place of arbitration and 
applicable law respectively.  
In spite of this clause, one of the parties instituted an 
action before the Federal High Court of Nigeria alleging breach 
of the contract. The shipowner and shipping company 
contended the jurisdiction of the court and filed an application 
for stay of proceedings pending the determination of the 
dispute before an arbitral panel in Germany. The trial court 
upheld the choice of law clause. This decision was affirmed by 
the Nigerian Court of Appeal on the basis of the sanctity of 
contract. On further appeal to the SCN by the Plaintiffs, the 
decisions of the two lower courts were overturned. In reaching 
its decision, the SCN noted that 
It is also conceded that when the intentions of parties to a 
contract, as to the law governing the contract, is expressed in 
words, this expressed intention is general and as a general 
rule determines the proper law of the contract. But to be 
effective the choice of law must be real, genuine, bona fide, legal and 
reasonable. It should not be capricious and absurd. Choosing 
German law to govern a contract between a Nigerian shipper 
and a Liberian “shipowner” is to my mind capricious and 
unreasonable.92 
 
 91 According to Clause 3 of the Bill of Lading: “Any dispute arising under this 
bill shall be decided in the country where the “Carrier” has his principal place of 
business and the law of such country shall apply except as provided else where 
herein.” 
 92 (Emphasis added). Continuing, the SCN noted that: “In this case, the rice 
was to be shipped from Thailand, the shippers are in Nigeria and the contract was to 
be performed in Nigeria by delivery in Lagos, Nigeria. The Bill of Lading was issued 
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More interestingly, it is important to note that the 
plaintiff attempted to call in aid one of the ‘piecemeal’ good 
faith concepts under the English contract law – contracts of 
adhesion.93 Such contracts are between unequal parties; here, 
the party with the bargaining power dictates and imposes the 
terms on the weaker party.94 In the event of a dispute where the 
weaker party is gravely disadvantaged by virtue of the unfair 
terms, English courts have prescribed an objective test of 
reasonableness.95 The SCN however found this argument 
inapplicable to sophisticated contracts such as this one.  
While it would be farfetched to conclude that Sonnar 
provides a general rule as per derogation from the explicit 
terms of a contract, the relative openness of Nigerian courts to 
guarantee justice in a contractual relationship can be gleaned. It 
must be emphasized that as the contrary position held in a later 
decision with similar facts shows, the decision of the SCN in 
Sonnar was informed by the inability of the plaintiff to initiate 
the action in Germany and not because a jurisdiction other than 
Nigeria was chosen by the parties.96  
 
by a Liberian company. The whole transaction from beginning to end had little or 
nothing to do with Germany. Why then invoke German law as the proper law of the 
contract?” [1987] LPELR – 3494 (SC), 44. 
 93 See: Friedrich Kessler, ‘Contracts of Adhesion - Some thoughts about 
freedom of contract’ [1943] 43:5 C L Rev 629 – 642. 
 94 See: Instore v A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1308. 
 95 See: Gillespee Bros. & Co. Ltd. v Roy Bowles Transport Ltd. [1973] Q.B. 400. 
 96 In The Owners of the M.V. Lupex v Nigerian Overseas Chartering and Shipping 
Ltd. [2003] LPELR – 3195 (SC) - where the bill of lading stated England as the place of 
arbitration- the SCN held in favour of the arbitration clause. The court in the latter 
case noted that the Sonnar decision was not applicable as no injustice will be done to 
the plaintiff. 
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C.  Contracts of Employment 
Another category of contracts where Nigerian courts 
have avoided fidelity to the sanctity of contracts approach to 
contractual interpretation is when a party attempts to escape an 
obligation under a contract of employment97 by claiming that 
such contract is illegal or contains illegal element. The case of 
West Construction Company Ltd. v. Santos M. Batalha98 involved a 
Nigerian company which employed a Portuguese as project 
engineer. The dispute that led to the case arose over failure of 
the defendant/appellant, to pay the plaintiff/respondent 
outstanding balance of salary /allowance for services rendered 
to the appellant company. The company contended that the 
contract with the respondent was illegal as it breached the 
Central Bank of Nigeria’s regulations prohibiting paying salary 
of expatriates in foreign currency and contrary to the Nigerian 
Immigration Act, and the respondent had no resident permit to 
work with the company. The trial court’s decision in favor of 
the company, i.e. that the contract was illegal, was overruled by 
the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of 
the Court of Appeal. The supporting decision of Pats-Acholonu 
JSC more comprehensively responded to the company’s bad 
faith. His Lordship identified, inter alia, the question “is it 
conscionable for the appellant knowing fully well that the 
respondent had no work permit entered into contract of 
employment with him by which it enjoyed his services and now 
falling on a skewed or contrived and hackneyed argument that 
 
 97 Contracts of employment are a classic example of a relational contract. In an 
employment relationship both employer and employee typically have mutual 
expectations, in terms of loyalty and cooperation from the other party, which cannot 
be reduced to a set of contractual rules.  
 98 SC. 168/2002, [2006] LPELR – 3478 (SC). 
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the contract of service was ab initio tainted with illegality?” In 
answering this question, he held that: 
A defence to an action which is ignoble on its face and tainted 
or besmirched with an oddity that is inherently dubious, 
dishonest and reprehensible does violence to a principle of 
equity and good conscience ought not in my view win the 
support of this court. This court should not lend itself to a 
defence for breach of contract which is embarrassing to any 
conscientious being and is an affront to civilized behaviour 
and decency … If there is any act of illegality about the nature 
of the relationship between the parties in respect of the alleged 
infraction of the prescription of Immigration Act, such 
knowledge shall be imputed to the appellant who closed its 
eyes in order to reap where it did not sow, to hoodwink and 
bamboozle the ignorant foreigner to work for it and fall back 
on a questionable defence of illegality. Nothing could be more 
ungallantly than this posture … It can therefore be seen that 
the appellant has no leg to stand in respect of the rather 
disgusting and revolting offensive attitude it adopted to shirk 
its responsibility when its acts traduced all known decent 
procedures in the circumstances. It is this type of sickening 
and condemnable behavior that gives Nigeria a bad name. 
The above has been quoted in extenso to highlight the 
deep-seated normative or moral consideration which actuates 
the decisions of Nigerian courts in contractual cases showing 
clear case of injustice. It is important to note that, indeed, the 
court agreed that the respondent had no resident permit, and 
by section 8 of the Immigration Act it was illegal for him to 
work without a permit in the country. This was however not 
enough to justify the appellant’s action, which was seen for 
what it really was – an attempt to deprive the respondent of his 
wages.  
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On the one hand, this case demonstrates the attitude of 
the Nigerian Supreme Court to apply the traditional piecemeal 
approach in reaching its decisions without expressly making 
the case for the development of a coherent principle of good 
faith or the recognition of a duty of honest performance. The 
next case illustrates this position further. On the other hand, I 
contend, as argued in the concluding section of this paper that 
out rightly recognizing the broad umbrella of good faith as an 
organizing principle as the Canadian Supreme Court did in 
Bhasin’s case will in fact provide an important framework for 
this type of cases in the future without necessarily jeopardizing 
the flexibility of the courts to continue to ensure that contractual 
agreements are interpreted to achieve social functions. 
D.  Banker-Customer Relationship 
In Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu,99 one of the issues 
was whether the operation of a particular account was tainted 
with illegality? The respondent was a co-signatory to a 
company account. He, however, subsequently notified the bank 
of his revocation of the co-signatoryship of the second signatory 
to the account. Thereafter, the respondent issued a series of 
cheques. While the bank honored one of the cheques, it 
dishonored subsequent cheques, citing incomplete mandate 
and the freezing of the account by a government taskforce as 
reasons. In resolving this appeal, the court noted inter alia that 
banker-customer relationship borders on good faith.100  
However, in reaching its decision, the court called in aid 
the principle of estoppel by conduct; the fact that after the 
revocation of the co-signatoryship, the bank honoured a cheque 
 
 99 [2007] LPELR – 8093 (CA). 
 100 ibid. 
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solely signed by the respondent.101 Relying on the provision of 
the Nigerian Evidence Act, the court concluded that having 
accepted a solely signed cheque after the notification of 
revocation of co-signatoryship, the bank is estopped from 
turning around to lay claim to the requirement in a previous 
agreement that for money to be drawn the cheque must be 
signed by two signatories. The court further held that: 
[A] party is estopped from denying or withdrawing his 
previous assertion or from going back on his own act, even if 
it is to tell the truth. The reasoning is simple it would promote 
fraud and litigation if a party is allowed to resile from his own 
act or representation on which the other part acted. The object 
of estoppel has always been to prevent fraud and enthrone justice 
between the parties by ensuring that there is honesty and good faith 
at all times.102 
It is implicit in the decisions on estoppel by conduct that 
the express terms of a contract regardless, a party can be held to 
representations made at the performance level. This much can 
be gleaned from a more recent decision of the NCA – Oloro Jay 
Jay v. Skye Bank Plc.103 Here, the appellant was contracted to 
execute a project at a polytechnic. To access the mobilization 
fee, he was required to obtain an Advanced Payment Guarantee 
 
 101 The court relying on conduct referenced section 151 of the Nigerian 
Evidence Act, (now section 169 of the Evidence Act, 2011) which provides that: 
When one person has, either by virtue of an existing court judgment, deed or 
agreement or by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted 
another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he 
nor his representative in interest shall be allowed, in any proceeding between himself 
and such person or such person’s representative in interest, to deny the truth of that 
thing. 
 102 Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1067) 1 at P. 26. 
paras. F - H; Pp. 26-27, paras. H - D 
 103 [2016] LPELR – 40185 (CA). 
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(APG) from a Bank. The respondent bank provided the APG 
with the condition that the mobilization fee will be deposited 
with it and given to the appellant as a loan. By the time the 
mobilization fee was released however, the APG had expired. 
Yet, the appellant issued a cross cheque depositing the 
mobilization fee with the bank, pursuant to the prior 
agreement. At the point of withdrawal, the bank requested that 
the appellant make a loan application. The appellant refused, 
contending that since the APG had expired, there was no need 
to apply for the loan anymore as the money was now his. The 
court, relying on the SCN’s decision in A.G. Rivers State v. A.G. 
Akwa Ibom State & Anor,104 held that having deposited the 
money with the bank despite the alleged expiration of the APG, 
the appellant was estopped from seeking an escape from the 
terms of the APG. Like it did in Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu, 
the court stated that to allow the appellant to renege from his 
representation will negate equity, justice, fairness and good 
conscience.105 
From the foregoing cases, it is clear that there is no 
coherent approach to the analysis of the doctrine of good faith 
by the Nigerian courts. The lack of coherence is not a problem. 
As I argued above, it affords the courts the much need flexibility 
of not only when to draw on good faith, but also, to continue to 
rely on established principles of contract if necessary. The ebb 
and flow of which interpretation is given has simply depended 
on the facts and justice that each case requires. In other words, 
there is judicial discretion or choice in respect of when the 
courts will invoke the good faith.  In such situations, they have 
 
 104 [2011] 8 NWLR 31. 
 105 Diamond (n 102) 
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found sufficient principles within the common law of contract 
to meet the need of justice while loosely referring to good faith.  
IV. TO RECOGNIZE OR NOT? THE GENERAL DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
AND DUTY OF HONEST PERFORMANCE UNDER NIGERIAN 
CONTRACT LAW  
In this section, I examine whether there is a need for the 
Nigerian courts to shift towards contemporary approach by 
recognizing a duty of honest performance or simply stick with 
the piecemeal traditional approach. Based on two reasons: lack 
of clarity in the ramifications or method for applying the duty 
of honest performance or conceptualizing good faith as an 
organizing principle; and the flexibility of the traditional 
piecemeal approach including by drawing on the English case 
of Yam Seng Plc, I posit that there is no need for Nigeria to follow 
the decision of the Canadian court in Bhasin. The English courts, 
unlike their Canadian counter-part, has stuck to its piecemeal 
approach to the good faith duty. 
In the Yam Seng Plc, two companies through their chief 
executives entered into a distributorship where Yam Seng Plc 
(claimant), which focuses on duty free sales, will distribute 
Manchester United branded products produced by ITC Ltd 
(defendant). At the point the initial agreement was signed by 
the parties, the defendant had untruthfully informed the 
plaintiff that it had signed a licence agreement with the brand 
owner to manufacture and sell Manchester United fragrances. 
Subsequently, the claimant failed to meet timelines set for the 
delivery of products. A situation which the defendant claimed 
had adverse impact on its goodwill with customers. The 
relationship however continued despite the several incidences 
of breach. The recourse to litigation was however actuated by a 
series of subsequent actions, including: the non-registration of 
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the product in China contrary to the representation made by the 
defendant, defendant’s failure to pay an invoice for some testers 
contrary to prior agreement and a false representation that the 
retail prices of the products are lower than the duty-free retail 
prices, when in the actual sense, contrary to agreement and 
practice, they were higher. Particularly, the court described the 
pricing issue as “the final straw”. The claimant had argued, in 
part, that there was “an implied term of the Agreement that the 
parties would deal with each other in good faith”.106 
In deciding Yam Seng, Leggatt J., extensively engaged 
with the concepts of relationality and good faith. In a sense, 
representing the latter as an incidence of the former. 
Importantly, the court entered the ‘fray’ of the debate on the 
need for a general duty of good faith in English contract law.  
After considering arguments for and against, the court held 
that: 
Under English law a duty of good faith is implied by law 
as an incident of certain categories of contract, for example 
contracts of employment and contracts between partners or 
others whose relationship is characterised as a fiduciary one. I 
doubt that English law has reached the stage, however, where 
it is ready to recognise a requirement of good faith as a duty 
implied by law, even as a default rule, into all commercial 
contracts … What good faith requires is sensitive to context. 
That includes the core value of honesty … The test of good faith 
is objective in the sense that it depends not on what either 
party’s perception of whether particular conduct is improper 
but on whether in the particular context the conduct would be 
regarded as commercially unacceptable by reasonable and 
honest people … Understood in the way I have described, there 
 
 106 Yam Seng (n 4) [119]. 
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is in view nothing novel of foreign to English Law in 
recognising an implied duty of good faith in the performance of 
contracts … Moreover such a concept is, I believe, already 
reflected in several lines of authority that are well established. 
… Because the content of the duty is heavily dependent on 
context and is established through a process of construction of 
the contract, its recognition is entirely consistent with the case 
by case approach favoured by the common law. There is 
therefore no need for common lawyers to abandon their 
characteristic methods and adopt those of civil systems in order 
to accommodate the principle.107 
The court held in part that “in giving Yam Seng 
information about the Singapore domestic retail price on which 
Mr. Presswell knew that Yam Seng was likely to rely and which 
he knew to be false”, the defendant was in repudiatory breach 
of the Agreement.108  
While not completely clear, it appears Leggatt J’s 
position on a general duty of good faith in common law is not 
necessary as the duty is already reflected in “several lines of 
authority” and “consistent with the case by case approach 
favoured by common law”. The earlier finding that there is 
nothing strange in recognising “an implied duty of good faith 
in the performance of contract” however makes the above 
summation less clear. Assuming Leggatt J did not endorse a 
good faith as a ‘general doctrine’, it appears that he suggested 
honesty as an implied term applicable to every contract. This is 
deducible from his holding that “What good faith requires is 
sensitive to context. That includes the core value of honesty”.109 
 
 107 ibid [131] – [147]. 
 108 ibid [173]. 
 109 ibid [141]. 
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The Yam Seng decision has been criticized on the basis of this 
‘general duty of honest performance’ among other things.110 
Perhaps, the most striking similarity between the 
Nigerian approach to good faith and the Yam Seng is the 
emphasis on good faith being an incidence of the intention of 
parties. The idea that good faith is endogenous to parties’ 
intentions as deduced from their agreement. This is illustrated 
in Leggatt J’s position that “…the basis of the duty of good faith 
is the presumed intention of the parties and meaning of their 
contract, its recognition is not an illegitimate restriction on the 
freedom of parties”.111 Another similarity which flows from the 
first is that rather than being implied in law, the expressions of 
good faith in common law of contract are “implications of terms 
in fact”.112 Such finding is consistent with the dominance of 
implied terms as Nigeria’s primary good faith expression. An 
interesting question, however, is if Nigerian courts would have 
resolved Yam Seng in the same way Leggat J. did, in the light of 
how the previously considered Nigerian cases were 
approached. It is very likely that Nigerian courts would have 
found that the contract was indeed breached, however, not 
necessarily on the ground of breach of a ‘good faith’ duty. As 
noted earlier, the operation of good faith in Nigeria is often 
shorn of direct reference to ‘good faith’ per se. It is indeed 
doubtful if Yam Seng has added substantially to the common 
law approach to good faith other than its extensive re-
articulation of what has always been recognized as good faith’s 
role in English law of contract. 
 
 110 J.W. Carter and Wayne Courtney, ‘Good Faith in Contracts: Is There an 
Implied Promise to Act Honestly?’ [2016] 75:3 CLJ 608, 618 – 619. 
 111 Yam Seng (n 4) [148]. 
 112 ibid [131]. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3307159
Olabisi Printer v 1.0 (Do Not Delete) 10/2/2019  8:37 PM 
2019] GOOD FAITH IN NIGERIAN CONTRACT LAW 401 
There are striking similarities between Yam Seng and 
Bhasin. Although the words ‘organizing principle’ were not 
employed in Yam Seng, the court was clear that there are certain 
established categories where good faith has been implied and 
that the courts will develop other categories as time goes on.113 
Also in Yam Seng, the court also recognised “the core 
expectation of honesty”.114 A major difference between both 
decisions, however, is the SCC’s finding that the duty of honest 
performance cannot be excluded by parties.115 Contrariwise, 
Leggatt J appears to have recognised the right of party to 
expressly exclude such duty.116 Importantly, while Leggatt J., 
considered the ‘duty of honest performance’ as a fact inferable 
from the facts of the parties’ agreement, the SCC considered 
such duty as “analogous to equitable doctrines which impose 
limits on the freedom of contract, such as the doctrine of 
unconscionability”.117 In fact, it is on the basis of construing the 
duty of honest performance as a doctrine rather than an implied 
term that the court found that the duty cannot be excluded by 
parties to a contract. 
Apart from the foregoing, since Nigerian courts continue 
to find fortress in their construction of commercial contracts in 
other principles of the law of contract, I submit that this obviates 
the need for a stand-alone duty of honest performance in 
Nigeria. To adopt a stand-along principle as the Canadian 
courts did would be to muddle up the waters of settled 
principles of the law of contract unnecessarily.  
 
 113 ibid. 
 114 ibid [141]. 
 115 Bhasin (n 2) [74] – [75]. 
 116 Yam Seng (n 4) [149]. 
 117 Bhasin (n 2) [74]. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
My objective in this article has been to examine the 
trajectory of the doctrine of good faith in Nigerian law of 
contract with a view to teasing out an area that has received 
minimal focus. The analyses of the Nigerian case law in the 
article regarding good faith reveals a traditional or piecemeal 
approach as opposed to the contemporary approach 
represented by the Canadian case of Bhasin. Incoherent and 
disorganized as it may seem, I contend that Nigerian courts will 
benefit from the flexibility that they enjoy in constructing 
commercial contracts based on their contexts as opposed to 
being wedded to an ‘organizing framework’; the modus 
operandi of which remains unclear. 
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